Abstract. This paper uses ideas from arti cial intelligence to show how default notions can be de ned over Scott domains. We combine these ideas with ideas arising in domain theory to shed some light on the properties of nonmonotonicity in a general model-theoretic setting.
Introduction
Why should the topic of domain theory have any connection with default reasoning, as commonly understood in arti cial intelligence? Our basic observation is that partial information is a fundamental concept shared by both areas. Essentially, domain theory is about partial information: elements of domains are partial objects, and total objects can be approximated by increasingly better approximations. Nonmonotonic reasoning, on the other hand, is also about partial information, though traditionally in AI it has been represented either disjunctively in theories, or model-theoretically by means of large structures of total models. There is growing awareness in AI of the importance of the idea: see, for example, the book on the topic 6]. Our contribution in this respect is merely a new technical tool. In particular, though, it focuses on the concept of observability as the kind of property from which we can jump to new conclusions. Domain theory has provided quite a lot of insight into structures of partial information. So, in addition to the ideas from AI which provide some new techniques for the study of general nonmonotonic phenomena in domains, we hope that, eventually, domain-theoretic insights can help resolve some of the anomalies which seem to plague default reasoning in AI. We are, however, not claiming that domain theory can be so applied without much work. Traditionally, domain theory deals mostly with monotonic, continuous functions. The challenges seem to be to nd the right interface between nonmonotonic reasoning and domain theory, and to develop a basic theory on a special class of nonmonotonic functions.
Nonmonotonic reasoning
Your friend's ight is scheduled to arrive at 12 noon. So you left home around 10:30 am to meet him at the airport. At the airport, you are told that the ight has been delayed and it will be arriving at 1 pm instead. This is a typical scenario considered in common sense (prototypical) reasoning in Articial Intelligence. A key property in common sense reasoning is that the conclusions made are only tentative (such as \arriving on time"), and may be defeated in light of new information. Because of this, the reasoning involved is called nonmonotonic. If we let S stand for \scheduled to arrive at noon", A for \does arrive at noon", and D for \delayed", then A follows nonmonotonically from S, but not from S and D. Intuitively, weakening fails.
Developing formal systems that capture this process turns out to be extremely interesting and challenging. In AI there has been more than a decade's work in this area. Some notable approaches include McCarthy's circumscription 9], Reiter's default logic 12], and McDermott and Doyle's autoepistemic logic 10] . A great deal is now known about these logics, though there are well-known problems with each of the approaches. Take Reiter's default logic, for example. This is an augmentation of rst order logic with extended rules called defaults. Extensions are a basic notion in default logic because these stand for sets of conclusions made using \common sense assumptions" embodied in the default rules. However, the following properties are often considered undesirable:
There can be multiple extensions. Extensions may not exist.
Even when they do exist, it can be too costly or impossible to nd them. Default logic does not support the familiar principle of reasoning by cases 2, 8] .
Standard entailment in default logic fails to have the so-called cumulativity property 4]. A possible reason why the current approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning may be that the approaches presume the syntax and the total model theory used in classical rst order logic 1 . This presents a fundamental mismatch between the theoretical tool on the one hand, and the phenomena we want to describe on the other. The basic view of classical logic is total: every issue is settled as either true or false, and truth values never change. In commonsense reasoning, our conclusions cannot be supported by proofs in the mathematical sense, and we need to take action in situations of partial information. The only place such information resides, in traditional default logic, is in the incompleteness of default theories. But it seems that the lack of information about an airplane's arrival time is not well captured by several incomplete scienti c theories of its particular ight. Instead, we propose to use defaults to complete this particular scenario by adding conjunctive atomic \facts" which are coherent with constraints on any total picture. We then reason about such extended pictures with traditional logics adapted for partial models. So instead of having several default theories (traditional extensions), we will have one default theory of this model: that theory which contains all sentences observably true in the model-theoretic extensions of the incomplete picture.
Default model theory (DMT), as developed in 15, 16, 18, 14, 13] , results from a marriage of domain theory with techniques from default logic. We summarize some of its key ideas.
Reiter's default rules can be regarded as semantic, not syntactic notions. In default logic, systems of defaults are interpreted proof-theoretically. In default model theory, systems of defaults are used to build partial models. We have generalized Scott's information systems to the setting of default reasoning. The notion of a \base theory" in default logic is replaced by the notion of a \base situation", or partial world. The notion of \extension" is retained, but now refers not to a collection of theories, but to a collection of situations, each containing more information than the base situation.
To reason about what happens in a base situation and its extensions, we have introduced several modal logics. All of them involve a modal operator B for belief. B' holds in a given situation s i ' holds in all extensions of s. Since the notion of validity in a model is primitive in our treatment, the modal logics are semantics based. Here is how DMT gets around, for example, the problem of multiple extensions. When extensions are regarded as partial (possible) worlds,the extension relation is similar to the accessibility relation in Kripke structures A default rule functions here not as an extended proof rule, but as part of a constructive procedure for building an agent's preferred worlds extending the current one. There can be many di erent worlds reachable from the current world. So the possibility of multiple extensions becomes a feature, not a bug { Kripke structures would be rather uninteresting if there were only one world accessible from the current one.
When defaults are regarded as a constructive method for building worlds, we can investigate di erent model building procedures. Reiter's extension operator, when phrased modeltheoretically, remains one of the key \algorithms" for building preferred worlds. However, extensions may not exist in some reasonable cases. To cope with this, we have introduced the notion of a \dilation", a robust generalization of the notion of an extension. Dilations exist in all reasonable cases.
Finally, we need to stress the analogy between default systems and programs. In domain theory, the meaning or behavior of a program is interpreted as an element of a domain (traditionally a Scott domain.) Our observation is that one can also interpret a system of defaults in this behavioral way; as being a kind of user-speci ed \program" whose meaning is not a given domain element, but a nondeterministic and nonmonotonic way of extending such an element.
Nonmonotonic entailment
The basic notion underlying a standard logic is that of an entailment. Traditionally, we say a ( nite) set of formulas entails a formula if every model of is a model of . A basic property of this entailment is monotonicity: if entails and 0 , then 0 entails . In the nonmonotonic case, what kind of entailment is appropriate? A considerable amount of work has been devoted to this basic question since the work of Gabbay 3] . Because there is no widely accepted model theory for nonmonotonic entailment, most other work does not follow the tradition in standard Tarskian logic: postulates about properties of nonmonotonic entailment come rst, models next. However, the justi cation and consequences of the various postulates are not understood to the extent we would like. Another approach, as taken in this paper, is to start from a model theory and let the models guide our way, in the tradition of Tarskian logic. We use the class of default models, which appears in this paper as a class of default domains and extensions.
The usual interpretation of X ; a (where ; stands for the nonmonotonic entailment relation) is that from the information X we can jump to the conclusion a. Many authors, in particular Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 7] , have considered Gabbay's axiom of cautious monotony:
X ; a & X ; b ) X; a ; b:
Reasoning with the assumption of this law, together with some other routine axioms, is sometimes called cumulative reasoning. We have found, however, that cumulativity fails given our logical setting. (Examples in the last section.) One cause of this failure is that disjunction can be used in the setting where pieces of information have propositional structure. This may lead us to believe that a similar failure would not occur without disjunctions; but we have found that even this is not true. Much of the paper is concerned with ways to get around this problem.
Contributions of the paper
We introduce the basic concept of defaults in Scott domains and show some basic properties related to extensions in Section 2. In Section 3, after a detailed discussion of some useful axioms related to abstract nonmonotonic entailment, we show that default domains are a concrete representation of these nonmonotonic entailments. In Section 4 we provide a variety of su cient conditions for defaults to induce cumulative entailments, those satisfy cautious monotony. In particular, we show that defaults with unique extensions are a representation of cumulative nonmonotonic entailment. Furthermore, we obtain a simple characterization for those default sets which determine unique extensions in coherent domains (they are di erent from coherent spaces!). In Section 5, we give a characterization of those Scott In the rest of the paper, we informally call a triple (D; v; ) a default domain. A rule like a : b b intuitively means that if a is current and b is compatible, then b can be added to the information state. Of course this is very vague, and indeed there are several di erent ways to make this intuition precise. However, the general sense is that if is the default set, and x is an element in D, then we can use to get to an element y w x, containing more information than x. Therefore, from an abstract point of view, a default set in a Scott domain (D; v) serves to generate a certain relation R on D which at least satis es the property that (x; y) 2 R implies x v y. However, at this point default sets are low level objects which do not have internal structure.
Perhaps the most important kind of relation generated from a default set is that of an extension, due to Reiter 12] Clearly, if is empty or the identity relation, then the extension relation is the identity relation. Also, for maximal elements m, like 1 ! above, we always have m m. This matches our intuition: if we already have perfect information about some object, defaults can tell us nothing more about the object.
Note that although an extension is a certain xed point, the de nition only provides a way to con rm one rather than to nd one. An extension seems to build up in stages, but at each step certain consistency with the extension must be checked. This is anomalous: to construct an extension, we must already know it! It is also this phenomenon that makes the extension relation nonmonotonic: if y is an extension of x and x 0 w x, then y need not be an extension of x 0 .
Do extensions always exist? What kind of properties does the extension relation have? Before answering these questions, we present a characterization of extensions. It generalizes an early result of Reiter's. It is easy to check that for xed x and v, (x; u; v) is a continuous function in u (we need to use the fact that the rst components of are all compact). Therefore, (x; u; v) has a least xed point l, such that (x; l; v) = l. However, (x; v) is the greatest lower bound of all xed points of (x; u; v) in u. This implies that
Hence, by the previous theorem, nding an extension is equivalent to nding a xed point of (x; v) in v, so that (x; (x; v); v) = (x; v) = v:
Proof. We prove a stronger result: for any y, 2
The following theorem summarizes some important properties of extensions for default domains. Because some results of this paper crucially depend on item 5, we give a proof for it in the order-theoretic setting.
Suppose x z, which means that z = G i2! (x; z; i):
We prove by mathematical induction that z = G Therefore (x t y; z; i) w (x; z; i) for every i 0.
2
Remember that a default set in a Scott domain is just a set of pairs of compact elements. However, the basic idea of a default rule is to let an agent to "jump to a certain conclusion". This means not all defaults makes sense, and certain forms of defaults may be useless. We are concerned in the remainder of this section about removing "useless" defaults and establish certain`normal forms' for defaults.
De nition 2.3 Let , 0 be default sets in a Scott domain (D; v). We say that and 0 are equivalent if they determine the same extension relation.
This rst kind of useless defaults are those of the form (a; b), where a is incompatible with b. The fact that we can safely remove them is con rmed in the following theorem, whose easy proof is omitted. To get 0 , we simply replace each (a; b) in by (a; at b) and remove those (a; b)'s where a and b are incompatible. According to the de nition of an extension, we can see that 0 and are equivalent. In the rest of the paper, we only consider defaults of the form (a; b) with a v b, although this restriction is not crucial in many cases.
Abstract nonmonotonic entailment
The purpose of this section is to introduce an abstract notion of a nonmonotonic entailment in a Scott domain and to show that default domains are representations of such entailments. Our axioms for the abstract nonmonotonic entailment is then justi ed semantically in the default domains.
Entailments, in general, should work at the level of logical statements. In the domain logic paradigm 1, 19] , the correspondence goes from domains to types, open sets to properties, and points to computations. So, strictly speaking, entailments should be at the level of Scott open sets. However, we would like to gain a better understanding of the basic cases before going to a full edged propositional version. For this reason, we consider nonmonotonic entailment between prime open sets of the form " x rst, where x range over compact elements of the domain. As a further reduction of the overhead, we simply work on an entailment between compact elements.
In the study of nonmonotonic consequences, the following axioms are often considered. For these axioms, X and Y range over nite sets of formulas, and a and b are single formulas.
Although Cut and Cautious cut are equivalent with the assumption of monotonicity, Cautious cut is strictly weaker without monotonicity.
In our domain-theoretic setting, we wish to generalize axioms like the above, but now nite sets of formulas will be replaced by compact elements in a Scott domain. To this end we introduce the notion of an abstract nonmonotonic entailment in a Scott domain. To summarize, the three di erent versions of cut are equivalent under the assumption of monotonicity. Without monotonicity, however, Cautious cut is strictly weaker than either of the other two cut rules. Here, it is informative to note that Supraclassicality and Cut' together imply monotonicity. Therefore, for an abstract nonmonotonic entailment, Cut and Cut' are equivalent, and either of them implies monotonicity.
Also note the interesting connections with the general inference rules for linear logic. The cut rule, which expresses the categorical concept of composition, here is replaced with a natural rule one would expect without weakening. But so far our system bears only a super cial resemblance to linear logic; much more work is needed to determine any precise relations.
We now show that a default domain (D; v; ) induces an abstract nonmonotonic entailment relation, via extensions.
Given a default domain, we de ne a relation ; by letting a ; b if
where is the extension relation for . What is unexpected is that the converse of the above theorem is also true. Every abstract nonmonotonic entailment is faithfully recaptured by some default domain. To describe the construction needed in the proof, we introduce an auxiliary notion called the nonmonotonic consequence bound, which is de ned as: e a := G fb j a ; bg:
Nonmonotonic consequence bound always exist because from the axioms of an abstract nonmonotonic entailment, it is easy to check that the set fb j a ; bg is directed.
We now describe the construction. Start with an abstract nonmonotonic entailment Extensions are a complicated, non-inductive construction, whose computational cost is very high. Theorem 3.2 tells us that with a proper encoding of the defaults, it is possible to greatly simplify the construction of an extension, at least conceptually, while keeping the nonmonotonic entailment relation unchanged. In fact, for the default set used in the proof of Theorem 3.2, only one single`application' of the default rules is su cient for us to obtain an extension. Moreover, each extension is nothing more than a certain kind of nonmonotonic bound.
However, although Theorem 3.2 is of signi cant conceptual value, there are at least two potential obstacles that may keep it from being directly applicable in implementation. One is that, in the construction of the default set , we used pairs like (a; b e a), where e a need not be a compact element. So, the construction of D 0 may transform a nitary domain D (in the sense that any compact element dominate only nitely many elements) to a non-nitary domain. This means that although b e a is compact, it may be required to code an`in nite amount' of information.
Is there a di erent construction, which avoids this problem, but still faithfully captures the nonmonotonic entailment? This is, surprisingly, indeed possible, although the construction is slightly more complicated, and we need to iterate the application of defaults twice to get to an extension. We are not going to present that construction here, but only refer the reader to 18].
The other issue is: what kind of domains are already good enough so we do not need to`grow the hair' out of them, as we did to get D 0 from D? This is important because if we go back and forth a couple of times, between ; and , we don't want the domain to grow arbitrary large. It is necessary to have somewhere to stop: i.e. a xed point where no further maximal elements need to be added to the domain.
These domains turn out to be just like the ones constructed earlier: they are called hairy domains. Intuitively, a hairy domain is one with enough maximal elements{at least as many maximals as non-maximals. In other words, a is the element immediately below the maximal element m a . Note that many familiar domains are hairy: the one-point cpo, the truth value cpo, the integer cpo, and so on. Of course, there exist domains which are not hairy, such as the diamond shaped cpo. Cautious monotony is a nice property to have because it makes the nonmonotonic entailment cumulative: if from a one expects many things, and if nothing unexpected happens, then none of the expected needs to be withdrawn.
Since Gabbay 3] , a considerable amount of work has been devoted to the study of cumulativity. As mentioned earlier, our work here di ers from other work in the following fundamental way: the other work assumes cautious monotony, and then searches for models having this property. Although models which capture cautious monotony do exist, they appear to be somewhat arti cial. Our starting point is, in contrast, the idea of defaults as used in default logic, seemingly unrelated to cautious monotony. Does the nonmonotonic entailment relation ; derived from a default domain (D; v; ) satisfy cautious monotony?
The next example shows that it does not have to. 2 It can also be seen from the above example that cumulativity is fragile for with respect to set inclusion. For example, if we add to a pair (a; b 0 ), or remove from it the pair (a 0 ; b 0 ), the induced relation ; becomes cumulative.
The question now is: what kind of a default set induces a cumulative entailment relation?
In the subsections to follow, we provide various useful characterizations for cumulativity.
Cumulativity and nonmonotonic closure
In ordinary logic, there is a useful notion called deductive closure of a set of formulae, de ned as fb j X`bg. We have, in the nonmonotonic case, also used a certain nonmonotonic closure operator, de ned as e a := F fb j a ; bg. For convenience, we still call e a closure operator although it need not have the property that e a = e e a: The next theorem shows that cumulativity amounts to equality between nonmonotonic closures of certain elements. Note that although this theorem is a characterization of cumulativity, it is not very helpful for deciding cumulativity from a default set directly.
Deterministic defaults
Let (D; v; ) be a default domain. We call a deterministic default set if The example given earlier for illustrating non-cumulativity is not a deterministic default set. Our next result shows that deterministic default sets induce a cumulative nonmonotonic entailment relation. The proof becomes very easy once the conditions for determinacy are digested. They ensure that in the process of building any extension for an element x in D, at most one default is ever applicable; further, the inductive construction terminates at stage 1 at the latest. Now suppose x ; y and x ; z. To show that (x t y) ; z, note that a default rule is applicable to x if and only if it is applicable to x t y, because at most one default rule is applicable, and (because x ; y) x v x t y v u for any extension u of x. This means x and x t y have the same extension sets. Therefore, (x t y) ; z.
Precondition-free defaults
There is a simple and yet very useful class of defaults considered in the literature, called precondition-free defaults. For a default domain (D; v; ), is called precondition-free if for each (a; b) in , a = ?.
The next result is the observation that precondition free structures give rise to a nonmonotonic relation supporting cautious monotony. Proof . Let x ; y and x ; z. We want x t y ; z. Suppose that t is an extension of x t y. Then by the previous lemma, there is a maximal subset B of 2 compatible with x t y, such that t = x t y t F B. We want to show that z v u. It su ces to show that x t F B is an extension of x. If x t F B is not an extension of x, it is because B is not maximal in the sense of Lemma 4.1. That is, there is some maximal C, a proper superset of B, compatible with x, and such that w = x t F C is an extension of x. By hypothesis, y v w, and we already have x v w. So C is a larger set than B, but compatible with x t y, violating the maximality of B. This contradiction proves that t is an extension of x. Thus z v t, as desired. 
Unique extensions and cumulativity
It turns out that cumulativity is closely related to the uniqueness of extensions. In fact, uniqueness of extensions characterize cumulativity: If there exists only one extension for every x 2 D, then the induced entailment from extension is cumulative, and moreover, each cumulative entailment is determined by a default set which produces unique extensions. This is stated precisely in the following representation result. Proof. The rst statement follows from item 5 of Theorem 2.2 and the unique extension property.
The second statement follows from the proof of the representation theorem{ Theorem 3.2, and Theorem 4.1.
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To check that the induced nonmonotonic entailment for a default domain (D; v; ) is cumulative, it is su cient to show that extensions are unique. However, it is clear that we need an e ective procedure for determining when a default set determines unique extensions, because the de nition for extensions is not helpful. In the rest of this section we present a characterization result for this purpose.
In 18] an e ective, su cient condition is given for unique extensions. However, that condition is not necessary. We now give a very simple condition which is both su cient and necessary for unique extensions on coherent Scott domains (an e ective characterization of unique extensions on general Scott domains remains unsolved). Recall that a Scott domain To better understand the theorem, we explain why it does not hold for non-coherent Scott domains, and why the condition cannot be replace by a more familiar one, such as a " a 0 ) b " b 0 :
Answers to both questions can be found in the two examples below.
Example. Consider this typical non-coherent Scott domain. This gives an increasing sequence, and as in the remarks before the proof, the least upper bound m of this sequence is an extension of x. But now let e be any other extension of x; then e = G (i; x; e)
by the de nition of extension. By induction, it is straightforward that for each i In the previous section we have studied various su cient conditions for a default set to induce a cumulative nonmonotonic entailment. In this section we study cumulativity along a di erent dimension: the underlying domain.
What kind of Scott domains (D; v) guarantee that when they are coupled with default sets the induced nonmonotonic entailments are always cumulative?
Of course, we must rule out the domain structure presented in the counterexample to cumulativity in the previous section. Luckily enough, that also turns out to be su cient.
De nition 5.1 A Scott domain (D; v) is daisy if for each x; y 2 D, we have x 6 " y ) x u y = ?:
As the name suggests, a daisy domain is one which branches out only at the root. Equivalently, a Scott domain is daisy if it is a collection of lattices smashed together at the bottoms. From an aerial perspective the domain looks like a daisy. Clearly, all lattices are daisy domains.
The main theorem of this section is the following. The following lemma, whose easy proof is omitted, is used in our proof. This lemma says that if y is an extension of x, and the only extension of t, strictly in between x and y, is y, then the nonmonotonic entailment determined by is cumulative. x; y in D, clearly x u y is strictly below both x and y. Let a be any xed compact element with a v x u y. We can nd compact elements x 0 , y 0 such that x 0 v x, y 0 v y, x 0 6 " y 0 , and, moreover, a v x 0 u y 0 . Now consider the default set f(?; x 0 ); (a; y 0 )g. We know that for this set to induce a cumulative nonmonotonic entailment, a must be the bottom. This shows that any compact element below x u y is the bottom. Therefore, x u y itself must be the bottom. 
Two remarks are in order. One is that although cartesian closure is an important idea in programming semantics, its relevance to default reasoning is unclear. The other remark is that our proof above is apparently related to bottomless cpos. It may be better to work in the framework of bottomless cpos directly and then obtain our result as a corollary; but we have not looked at this.
It should be pointed out that the notion of`only knowing' should be a local concept. To be realistic, one always has other knowledge, or information, or even other believes. Nevertheless, one can still conclude that Tweety ies with the additional information that Spot is a puppy. A more precise notion of only knowing should also deal with the notion of`independence', the idea that two pieces of information are not related. This has been discussed in the probabilistic literature (e.g., 11]), but not extensively in the logical literature. All of this may be better treated in a version of rst order logic. The present paper, however, takes the simple minded view of`only knowing'.
De nition 6.1 Let (D; v; ) be a default domain, and let ; be Scott open sets in (D; v).
We say that nonmonotonically entails in this default domain if for every minimal point x in (x 2 ), every extension of x is in .
As pointed out in the introduction, cautious monotony fails for nonmonotonic entailment which involves disjunctive information. For the sake of completeness, we restate the example in pure order-theoretic terms.
Consider the domain f f p ?
The minimal points of ' are w and f. For '^ the unique minimal point is w. This has the unique extension w t f, so '^ ; . Also, the extensions of the minimal points of ' are w t f and w t f, respectively. In both of these w holds, so that ' ; . But ' does not ; , since we have the extension w t f.
The problem here is that by moving to a minimal point of '^ we are forgetting the information in w t f and w t f which we had when we were guring out the conjunction. The second of these models would block the extension w t f.
Is this counterexample a realistically valid one? Imagine that w stands for a property that the typical bird has, like \wingspan less than 6 feet"; and f stands for the property of ying. Using a new atom b for \bird", we could reason as follows: Suppose that birds normally y, and birds normally have wingspans less than 6 feet. Using intuitive reasoning, it seems that from b^(w _ f) we could jump to the conclusion b^w. It also seems reasonable to accept b^w ; f. But from b^(w _f) ; b^w we get by weakening b^(w _f) ; (b^w)_(b^f). Let be the formula (b^w) _ (b^f), be the formula b^(w _ f), and be f. Then ^ is equivalent to b^w, from which we conclude f. But from (b^w) _ (b^f) it does not seem reasonable to conclude f because of the case b^f.
The previous examples indicate that nonmonotonic entailment on open sets do not satisfy cautious monotony, neither cautious cut. We now want to say something a rmative about the nonmonotonic entailment on stable neighborhoods (Scott open sets whose minimal points are pairwise incompatible; see 19]) by assuming the property of unique extensions.
The following is a collection of laws that hold in this case. Note that stable neighborhoods are disjoint, so that whenever we write p _ q, we implicitly also mean that p^q = false.
Note that stands for strict entailment, and = is the derived equivalence. When we write p q, we mean p is a subset of q (the smaller the open set, the more information we have).
As usual, &, ), and , are reserved for our meta-language. 
